No. 410
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 22, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 285.
Strictly Secret. To be handled in government code.
Re your Excellency’s # 349 [a] to the Ambassador in America.
From Terazaki and Ito (after consultation with Minister MIURA).
1. It is believed best not to regard Mexico, as heretofore, as the main base of intelligence in comparison to Brazil, Argentina and Chile for the following reasons:
a. As it is difficult to get information about internal conditions in the United States except by newspapers and magazines, there is no other way possible other than the assignment of a specialist, for this work takes a great deal of time.
b. The general feeling of the public in Mexico is good; but aside from Japanese‑Mexican relations, it is judged that at the present time Mexico may be properly viewed as a dependency of the United States.
c. Referring to the last part of your caption message, should the United States join the war, Mexico would follow suit, if not formally, at least practically.
d. Should Mexico go to war it would be impossible, because of communications, to expand (or it may be translated ‘to transfer’) the intelligence organization.
2. It is not expedient to have Mexico as an important or the chief base. It is believed suitable to make the country you mention in your caption message the main base.
Of course, in case of war, in using all available points, Mexico may be properly utilized.
In accordance with the idea of your suggestions along this line, a continued study is being made of practicable plans for intelligence ‘routes’ and connections.
This has been transmitted to the United States.
[a] See II, 411; in which Tokyo orders Consul ITO and Secretary TERAZAKI to Mexico and outlines the plans for establishment of an intelligence net.
Trans. 7‑28‑41
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No. 411
FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Washington # 349.
Secret outside the Department.
(To be handled in Government Code.)
Re # 18 [a] from New Orleans and # 244 (?) [b] from Mexico to this Foreign Minister.
We wish Consul ITO to go to Mexico City. Lately the offices housing the German and Italian Consulates were closed and their intelligence net broken. Intelligence activities in the Americas and suitable liaison are now essential, so we wish Secretary TERAZAKI also to go to Mexico to confer with our Minister there, in order to realize our plans in a concrete fashion based on the policy described in previous messages. We want Secretary TERAZAKI, and him only, to stop off at Quito, Los Angeles, San Francisco, etc. In this connection the points which we would like to bring to your attention are as follows:
1. We will have three routes to Mexico from the United States, consisting of Laredo, Ciudad Juarez and Mexicali. Mexicali in particular is a convenient point for us on the west coast. In case we need more personnel, we can get them from our Ministry in Mexico.
2. We will establish a Chile route from Mexico to Manzanillo and a Brazil route by way of Vera Cruz.
3. Various officials in the United States and Mexico will work out all the details of their own espionage nets, correlate them, and develop a concrete plan for making contacts and exchanges on the border.
4. In order to succeed in the objective, ways and means for keeping in contact through telegraphy, telephones, memoranda, and word of mouth will be decided upon and put into effect.
5. These routes are to be established against the day of evil and, while all is calm, nothing must be done which would jeopardize their security; therefore, at present investigate only the feasibility of circulating over them.
6. The expenses are to be paid by the several offices.
Because of its geographical position, Mexico is the main point for intelligence work in Brazil, Argentina and Chile, as well as in the United States. Therefore, before we think of relying too much upon Brazil, Argentina and Chile, let us concentrate on Mexico. However, the other three bases are different. In case the United States joins the war, they would inevitably come under her control, but so long as Mexico does not officially join the war, we can continue our intelligence schemes there. Paralleling these plans of ours, if you can also work out a plan for establishing a liaison net with Brazil, Argentina and Chile, it would be excellent groundwork for the establishment presently of an intelligence net. Please transmit this to Mexico City and take with you to New Orleans.
[a] Not available.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 7‑25‑41
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No. 412
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 254.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Strictly secret‑To be handled in Government Code.
Re your # 115 [a].
After conferring with the “L” Agency, I send you the results, together with my humble opinions. After you have conferred with the naval officials fully on this matter, please send me instructions.
1. The “L” Company also seems frequently to have felt the need of this sort of thing. For a long time they have been highly in favor of this kind of proposal and hope earnestly that we can put it into practice. Be sure, so far as receiving is concerned, we are even now able to use the “L” Agency.
2. The transmitter should be placed in the office at the very beginning. While we are experimenting and while we are actually transmitting, we will take every technical precaution possible to conceal it. We will have to be particularly careful to avoid the method of exchanging messages. We must rather rely upon broadcasts. If this apparatus should be discovered by Mexico sometime in the future, we are determined to hold our ground on the basis of inviolability. If, after experimenting with the machine as amateurs, we took it into the building, that would be dangerous. Such a plan would not do.
2. (Sic) I have three suggestions concerning the procurement of the transmitter. However, if possible, I would like for you to use the first.
(1) If there is a sufficient margin of time, you might obtain such a machine in one unit from the Navy and ship it to me as a private piece of furniture.
(2) After purchasing the manner of machine you have mentioned, in the United States, we might bring it into Mexico. (Concerning the quality, price, etc., we would have to get in touch with our agents in the place of purchase.)
(3) We might purchase the parts here or in the United States and assemble a composite instrument. However, we would encounter many technical difficulties in the last proposal and would have to enlist the assistance of our special naval officials in New York.
3. In the matter of the transmitter and personnel necessary to operate it, the “L” Agency is prepared to cooperate with us, and I do not think we would have any trouble along those lines.
4. If we use the first proposal mentioned in paragraph 2, we could communicate directly with Japan, so when you come to consider this, please consider direct communication and relay liaison in separate categories. (I do not mean to say, however, that there is any objection to your considering simultaneously liaison between relay stations.)
[a] Not available.
Trans. 7‑10‑41
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No. 413
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 247.
Strictly Secret.
To be handled in Government Code.
(Part 1 of 2) [a].
Re your # 93 [b] and my # 244 [c].
1. Need I tell you that I will try my very best to knit closely and strengthen our American intelligence net (please consider the question of the route in an entirely different category) and to foster the anti‑American and anti‑war atmosphere in Mexico? But, still I feel I may say fairly conclusively that, in the light of existing conditions in this country, we cannot expect to achieve very much along these lines.
2. I mean to say that the political and foreign policy of Mexico is directed by President CAMACHO and his cabinet, which is with him body and soul. It is not too much to say that they will brook absolutely no interference or even suggestions. Not only that, but every one of these gentlemen is strongly pro‑American and it would be absolutely impossible, I think, to procure any information which would stand our glorious Empire in good stead. Since CAMACHO seized control here, particularly in recent times, there has been a fierce and relentless campaign to control or stamp out labor, Communist, Nationalist and anti‑American groups. I am sorry to say that I cannot see any chance at all of our succeeding here with any of our schemes.
3. Well, the first and foremost aim or our schemes is to ruin the position of leadership which the United States has with regard to the other nations of the hemisphere, to break up its so-called “Good Neighbor Policy” and thereby destroy any possibility of future coordination among these nations. Granted that this is our main objective, if we are to succeed, I should think it would be a better policy to turn our eyes elsewhere, rather than to pin our hopes upon a fruitless nation like this. I do not think it would be amiss to try some relatively simpler plan.
[a] Part 2 of 2, See II, 414.
[b] In which MATSUOKA says 100,000 yen have been appropriated for intelligence and enlightenment expenses during the current fiscal year and gives instructions as to its use. See II, 384.
[c] Not available.
Trans. 7‑9‑41
No. 414
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 4, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 247.
(Part 2 of 2) [a].
Secret outside the Department.
Military Attaché NISI, attached to this office, has a great deal of confidence in the possibility of planning a rebellion in Guatemala. Although he had submitted his suggestion about
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three months ago to the military authorities in Tokyo, he was advised to wait and watch developments while maintaining liaison with those interested, because at that time our relations with the United States were delicate. On the other hand, is it not also a good plan to get Marshall URUTAADO of Nicaragua, concerning whom I made reference in my secret message # 62 [b], to lead a rebellion, since he is not only a very influential man but a greatly respected person?
5. Such a plot might not necessarily be a success in every respect; however, even if it fails, if it’s carried out to a certain extent, it would have to be quieted by the United States using its armed forces. In such a case, it would cast a shadow on the so‑called “Good Neighbor Policy” of the United States and cause a cleavage among the countries on the American continent. It would also endanger considerably the fundamental policy on which the United States attaches the greatest importance, a policy which envisages placing within her influence the regions extending to Panama. If it succeeds to an extent, it would at least upset at once the political balance among the countries as far as Panama. It would seem to me that there is considerable likelihood of its turning that region into an arena of political confusion.
6. Therefore, I wish to request that you give this matter your careful consideration in the light of our national policy. Furthermore, even if we provide the funds necessary for this plot, it is plain that the plans would not be carried out immediately on the following day, and so it seems to me that we should provide funds sufficient to commence preparations for the rebellion in accordance with the contingencies that may arise.
7. In case the above plot is carried out, I am of the intention of placing the entire leadership in the hands of a military official who has had the greatest amount of training and experience as a specialist in plotting. May I have a reply as soon as possible?
[a] See II, 413.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 7‑8‑41
No. 415
FROM: Mexico (Miura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 250.
Secret.
Re your # 92 [a].
1. It has become extremely difficult to obtain definite information or get hold of best opinions here in this country. Your attention is called to my # 247 [b] and other telegrams. (At present, I am leaving on a two months’ inspection tour of Central and South America. At the end of that period I am returning to my post here. According to reports made by the Military Attaché, there is no nation on the American continent that feels the hand of, and has been influenced by, the United States as much as Mexico.) This is evident but the government here is in reality an absolutist one. The relations concerning the recognition of the CAMACHO administration have been a delicate problem. The government authorities have been daring in directly announcing their feelings in order to lead along the masses who are not necessarily in accord (with the delicate problem of recognition, etc). This (action of the authorities) is seen to be an exception when compared to most other countries and may be termed a
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distinctive phenomenon of this country. Conditions have become very difficult and this may well explain why PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, has been able to make explanations, which are apparently not in keeping with the position he holds.
2. The conditions of the countries where there are missions are respectively different. Furthermore, there are changes from time to time which are brought to your attention. As in ancient China, there are those who say one thing and others who say another, and this sort of information was satisfactory. But you cannot “justify” the use of only this method in all countries throughout all times. The missions abroad are submitting to the home country accurate judgments and it is not asked whether or not these are (just) newspaper articles. Appropriately, I have been using the above‑mentioned means as well as noticing the public announcements made by the President and PADILLA, the Foreign Minister, in their character of public officials. These have been systematically reported, together with “comments”. As other materials, developments of conditions in this country have been reported.
Reply has been made in accordance with your telegram. (I have become fatigued and exhausted from this sending of telegrams for successive days and nights.)
[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 414 and 413, in which MIURA discusses the Japanese plans to strengthen the American intelligence net and to foster anti‑American and anti‑war atmosphere in Mexico.
Trans. 7‑14‑41
No. 416
FROM: San Francisco (Muto) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 116.
To Chief Archivist SHIGEMATSU from Courier TAKI.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
I have the Imperial portraits with me on the Kamakura Maru. Arriving Yokahama on the 20th with ten courier pouches. Please arrange to have my clearance expedited. http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US
Trans. 8‑4‑41
No. 417
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 6, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 249.
Secret.
Re your Circular # 1366 [a] to the Ambassador in the United States.
1. I am keeping in mind the essence of your instructions. If the United States (in view of the) preparations made, enters the war, it is impossible to tell when Mexico would follow the United States into war. If Mexico should not do this, it is not hard to imagine that Mexico would fall into a position similar to that of actual participation. In any case, it would be impossible to carry on trans‑Pacific commerce. It is, therefore, doubtful that the Emperor’s Portrait could be returned and so plans are being considered for returning it, for the time being, to the (Foreign Affairs) main office by safe and secret means.
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2. After the Emperor’s picture is placed in a double wooden box and securely wrapped, it is to be taken to Acapulco by a member of the office and will be registered with the Mexican Foreign Office as baggage belonging to the Naval Attaché, SATO. It will be entrusted with the captain of the “Ginyo Maru” leaving Acapulco on July 20. You are to arrange that someone from the main office make an official trip to Yokahama for it. If there are no objections to this plan, please telegraph an immediate reply.
[a] In which instructions are given for handling the Emperor’s portrait in case of war.
Trans. 7‑15‑41
No. 418
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 7, 1941
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin) # 249.
Regarding your Circular # 1366 [a]:
With reference to the purport of your instructions, complete arrangements are under way for handling the situation in the event that the United States should enter the war. Mexico would inevitably follow the United States, and we would have to withdraw upon her actual entrance into the war.
Our position under such circumstances would be insecure, and it would become axiomatic that communications on the Pacific would become impossible, and it is feared that it would be impossible to return the Imperial Portrait. Consequently, we are considering the most secure means of sending it to the Foreign Office.
Twenty cases carefully packed and addressed to the Foreign Office have been taken to Acapulco under seal, as personal luggage by Naval Attaché Sato, and are held there in care of employee Ide, to be entrusted to the captain of the Ginyo Maru leaving on 22 July. Please make arrangements to send someone from the Foreign Ministry to receive them when the ship arrives at Yokohama. If there is no objection to this procedure please reply promptly.
This is a retransmission of my message of the 5th.
[a] To forestall the possibility of their offices in foreign countries being closed without warning by the countries involved, Matsuoka issues instructions that precautions shall be taken for the safety of the Emperor’s portrait, and, at the opportune time, the destruction of codes and official documents.
Trans. 9‑19‑41
No. 419
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka) July 10, 1941
TO: Mexico City # 118.
Re your # 249 [a].
There are no objections to the procedure you suggested. Take care that information about this matter does not get outside the Department. Also, be careful in dealing with the captain.
[a] See II, 417‑Re Mexico’s plan for shipment of Emperor’s portrait back to Japan.
Trans. 7‑18‑41
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No. 420
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 14, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 262.
Re your message # 118 [a].
I would like to have the Imperial portraits at the Salvador Consulate handled in the same manner as those of this office. Therefore, please issue instructions to have them sent to catch the Ginyo Maru leaving Acapulco [b] on the 22nd. In case they miss this boat, have them use the next mail steamer, the “Rakyuo Maru”. In this case, I would like to send a member of my staff to Salvador.
[a] See II, 419.
[b] A seaport on the SW coast of Mexico.
Trans. 7‑23‑41
No. 421
FROM: Mexico July 8, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 251.
1. I understand that the great majority of the Japanese residents in the United States intend to remain in that country in the event matters come to the worst between Japan and the United States. In the light of the manner in which both the United States and Mexico have been treating Germans and Italians recently, there is, of course, no possibility of Mexico’s allowing Japanese residents from other countries to enter within her border. For this reason, insofar as we are concerned, the question of accommodating the Japanese now resident in the United States is not an immediate one. Circumstances affecting this question have changed from those which influenced my former views on the matter.
2. Furthermore, the Japanese residents in this country, who are to a large extent permanent settlers, entertain the same views as those residing in the United States. We may expect that there will be a lapse of a certain amount of time before Mexico definitely takes an attitude completely in harmony with that of the United States. However, since by that time it will already be extremely difficult to sail on Japanese ships or to take airplanes for South American countries, Japanese residents in the country (including the members of this office) would very likely be obliged to remain here.
3. Therefore, on the basis of the situation described above, we are making preparations at this office to call, on about the 15th of this month, in an inconspicuous manner, fourteen or fifteen representatives from various parts of the country so that we may learn of the situation existing in those parts as well as discuss such questions as mutual help among Japanese residents in the respective districts, maintenance of liaison between Mexico City and these districts, promotion of friendly feeling toward us among people in Mexico and protection of enterprises as well as property of the Japanese residents. We are, also, considering dispatching members of this staff to the various localities as a result of this conference and in response to political developments.
Trans. 7‑11‑41
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THE “MAGIC” BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR
No. 422
FROM: Mexico City July 19, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 278.
Re your message # 144 [a] to Brazil.
In accordance with the contents of my message # 251 [b] , I summoned the more influential people in Mexico City and representatives from the various areas in Mexico, to my office. I relayed to them your instructions with regard to our giving guidance to our nationals residing in Mexico. Following this up, I warned them of the things they as Japanese should be prepared to face, and asked them to consider ways and means of making the best of them.
The various points listed below were decided upon as being the best way of meeting the present situation. All those present assured me that our nationals would understand them, and would do everything in their power to adhere to our decisions.
1. In view of the times, it is of the utmost importance that there be an efficient system of liaison with this office so that we may act in unity. We decided that we could best accomplish this by, first of all, strengthening the Federation of Japanese Associations. At the same time, we divided the country into nine areas, taking into consideration its geography, transportation facilities, and the distribution of the population of our nationals. In each area a liaison officer will be installed who will offer guidance to our nationals residing in his area as well as to report, at suitable intervals, the general conditions of his area. He will, also, relay in the most effective manner instructions issued by this office to the Japanese population in his area.
2. As a means of protecting our nationals in the event of unfavorable developments in the future, we shall endeavor to at all times promote better feeling toward the Japanese people among the Mexicans. Towards this end, we should urge the members of the Japanese Associations and more particularly influential Japanese persons, to make an even greater effort than heretofore. When and if worse comes to worst, each area will put into effect the most appropriate means of protecting the people therein. Funds to be used in such an emergency will be collected within the areas themselves.
3. Means of protecting Japanese businesses in the event of unfavorable developments as well as steps which shall be taken if there are indications that Japanese assets in Mexico will be frozen, were decided upon along the lines contained in my message # 174 [c].
[a] Not available.
[b] See II, 421. Mexico City wires Tokyo that a great majority of Japanese residents will probably remain in the U.S. in the event of a break with the U.S. That Mexico would probably not permit Japanese from U.S. to enter that country. A conference of Japanese representatives from various parts of Mexico will meet shortly in Mexico City to formulate plans for mutual help among Japanese districts.
[c] Not available.
Trans. 7‑22‑41
No. 423
FROM: Mexico City (Miura) July 10, 1941
TO: Tokyo # 257.
Strictly secret.
The port of Manzanillo is the greatest unloading point for imports and exports from there to Japan. Furthermore, as you know, this port depends for its life upon Japanese ships. For a
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long time I have felt the need of establishing a consulate there. The United States, whose interest in this port is relatively negligible, has a consulate, and lately Great Britain, who has never had any interest at all in Manzanillo, has also established a consulate there. According to reliable information, the American Consul is bringing to bear considerable pressure on the Mexican officials in unison with the British Consul, and they are closely spying upon our merchants to see what goods they ship to Japan. This is easy for them because we lack a diplomatic office of our own, and that is why we feel all the more keenly the need of one. Thus, summing up all I have been able to learn, if we Japanese could establish two or three consulates and branch offices throughout Mexico, we would get extremely gratifying results. Because of its central position and particularly because of our imports and exports to and from this point, we consider Manzanillo the best choice. Moreover, last year our consulate at Mazatlan was closed, and now our nationals there suffer many inconveniences as a result. Therefore, I would suggest that you also consider establishing an assistant consulate there.
Trans. 7‑18‑41
No. 424
FROM: Tokyo July 10, 1941
TO: Mexico # 119.
Re your # 237 [a].
Inquiry is being made of the Artificial Silk Export Association. Because of the shortage of ships, there was no export plan for July. As yet no definite plan has been evolved for August. Already there is a plan for the export of about 12,000 boxes (because of the shipping shortage, there is slight prospect for 6,000). In order to form a decision, your reports are being studied at this time. Because of the Government’s order in connection with the defense plan, it is necessary to obtain permits for the export of silk thread. A step has again been taken in this connection. Please give your opinion of the limits of the exports to Mexico. The Department of Trade and Industry has given its approval. (Inform the Export Association branch about this.)
In the Mexican exports to Japan, the list of goods prohibited from exportation (must be considered ?) ‑‑‑‑(garbled) ‑‑‑‑‑ ‑‑‑– because of the strict control of munitions, follow out the plan given in your # 298 [b], Part 2, by trying to guarantee the supply of quick‑silver and materials for military use.
[a] Available, not translated. Contains discussion of steps necessary for exportation; the necessity of Japan for certain materials; and Mexico’s giving preference to the United States in her export shipments.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 7‑12‑41
http://LOUIS-J-SHEEHAN-ESQUIRE.US
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